What I find interesting in the following logical syllogism is that the Calvinist, in order to avoid being a universalist (5), has to to deny premise 1 or redefine God’s love - which is to deny premise 2. If Calvinists were honest about this, Calvinism would die out fairly quickly in churches because the denial of 1 or 2 goes against what most church people consider God’s fundamental attribute. In other words, complete openness on this subject would be the death of Calvinism.
P1.God truly loves all persons.
P2.To truly love someone is to desire their well being and to promote their true flourishing as much as you can.
P3.The true well being and true flourishing of all persons is to be found in a right relationship with God, a saving relationship in which we love and obey him.
P4.God could determine all persons freely to accept a right relationship with himself and be saved.
5.Therefore, all will be saved.
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Pandora’s box reopened! I am not a Calvinist, so I can’t assume how they will redefine P2. But I bet some might. I also think that P4 might be attacked. Maybe there will be appeals to a limited sense of free will.
I look forward to reading the responses.
Silly Billy.
God doesn’t care about love. God only cares about brining as much glory to himself as possible. If a few billion souls have to burn in hell for all eternity to prove how awesome he is, then so be it!
Ah yes, the classic “reductio ad universalism” for a refutation of Calvinism? I believe that this argument unfortunately is neither sound nor valid. I first wish to show its invalidity, but I am going to have to re-word the argument first. More on this later.
Tom,
The Arminian/Semi-Pelagian has to do the same thing in order to avoid the pitfalls of universalism, only they tinker with the efficacy of the cross and the atonement of Jesus. They have to say either a.) Jesus atoned for all sin but the sin of unbelief, thus his death does not atone for all sin; or b.) Jesus doesn’t actually save but hypothetically/possibly saves, thus Jesus doesn’t really atone for sin.
JR,
I loved the shirt you had in the creation museum, I have the same one. But as to your remarks to God’s glorifying himself. Have you considered what the Bible defines as God’s glory? Ex. 33:18-19 defines God’s glory as his name, Yahweh. Then in Exodus 34:5-7 ESV, God explains his name as meaning he is "merciful and gracious, slow to anger, and abounding in steadfast love and faithfulness, keeping steadfast love for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin, but who will by no means clear the guilty, visiting the iniquity of the fathers on the children and the children’s children, to the third and the fourth generation." For God to glorify himself, he must act graciously, mercifully, patiently, lovingly, faithfully, forgiving and justly. Are you sure God does not do all that he can do to bring honor to his name if it means being these selfless qualities? It seems to me he would. But this might lead us back into the question at hand in the post. I just see that you make the same mistake that many do, i.e. Ben Witherington III, when trying to understand the Reformed/Edwardsian worldview.
Ok. So first I want to reconstruct Tom’s argument as best I can in technical, logical language, so that this argument’s flow can be seen as easily as possible. All of the premises, except (3), are pretty straight forward. Here are the first two premises:
1. For all X, if X is a person, then God truly loves X.
2. For all Y and for all X, if Y loves X, then Y desires for X’s well being and Y desires to promote X’s true flourishing as much as Y can.
2a. For all X, if X is a person, then God desires for X’s well being and God desires to promote X’s true flourishing as much as God can. (from 1 and 2)
I added (2a) merely to simplify what is being said about (1) and (2). Now premise (3) is a bit tricky. I believe what Tom means when he says “the true well being and true flourishing of all persons is to be found in a right relationship with God” is that the latter clause is a necessary condition for the former clause. Thus, premise 3 is:
3. For all Y and for all X, if Y desires for X’s well being and Y desires to promote X’s true flourishing as much as Y can, then Y desires for X to be in a right relationship with God.
Now, the conjunction of premises 1, 2, 2a, and 3 can be formulated in one simple premise, which I will call 3a (this is done by the logical law of hypothetical syllogism). Thus, Tom’s original argument is simplified down to two premises along with the conclusion, which supposedly all Calvinists must hold to.
3a. For all X, if X is a person, then God desires for X to be in a right relationship with God (i.e. Himself). (from 1-3)
4. For all X, if X is a person, then God is able to determine X freely to accept a right relationship with God (and thereby be saved).
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
5. Therefore, for all X, if X is a person, then God saves X.
If this argument is to have any persuasive force as rallying call for the death of Calvinism, two things must be true. One, Calvinists must agree that (3a) and (4) are both true (which I think they would), and two, the truth of (3a) and (4) necessarily entails the truth of 5. This means that (3a) and (4) cannot be truth while (5) is false in order for this argument to be a valid one. Unfortunately, this argument is invalid. As one can see, Tom’s argument has two conditionals as the premises, a conditional as the conclusion, and the same antecedent for all three conditionals (i.e. a universal statement about persons). The form of the argument is as such:
6. If p, then q
7. If p, then r
____________
8. If p, then s
This is like arguing:
9. All bachelors are unmarried.
10. All bachelors are males.
__________________________
11. Therefore, all bachelors are named Ted.
This is not a valid form for an argument. Although (9) and (10) are true—indeed necessarily true—this does not entail that (11) is true, for there could be an unmarried male named Carl. Likewise, (3a) and (4) do not entail (5), for there could be a person who God desires to be in a right relationship with Himself, and who God could determine him/her to accept a relationship with Himself, but who is in actuality not saved. Therefore, some additional premises are needed to make this argument a valid one. Likewise, these premises must be accepted by Calvinists if the argument is going to be persuasive.
Thank Travis, thank you for your post.
I’ve got a response, but I’m going to need a few days - your argument deserves a decent response, not a quick one.
Thank you for your patience. I appreciate that this discussion has not turned nasty.
Tom, thank you for bringing up this discussion. Universalism has often been a doctrine of hyper-Calvinism. For example, the theology of Karl Barth–a hyper-Calvinst in my opinion–has often been criticized for being universalist (although this is debatable). Nonetheless, Calvinism in its most extreme can has definetly, although irrationally, lead to a universalism of some sort.
Later on, I hope to give you some probable premises that might be used to make your argument a valid one. Also, I hope very much that this discussion does not become a nasty one. Too much humility is not possible when discussioning matters theological. Especially noncardinal issues such as the nature of the will and predestination.
Travis, just a question…I think it may clear up some of my confusion about your response…
An invalid argument has solely to do with structure (if I remember my college logic class rightly).
A sound argument has to do with validity + all premises being true.
My confusion, I think, is that my argument structure appears to be acceptable.
So, unless I have my definitions mixed up, can you explain what is wrong with the actual structure of my argument?
I understand you don’t think it is sound, that is, you reject the assertion that the conclusion follows from the premises, but if validity only has to do with structure, then I don’t understand why this structure is invalid (b/c the rejection of the conclusion, it seems to me, should fall under the ’soundness’ of my argument, not the validity).
Once I get that cleared up, I think we can deal with the soundness of the argument - and my rebuttal that, supposing my argument is valid, it is sound as well. (Again, if I have my definitions of ‘valid’ and ’sound’ straight.)
I don’t need a long explanation, just a short one that pin points the structural deficiency of the argument.
Thank, again, man. I appreciate your contribution to this post and in other posts.
Though we would all like for all people to agree with us, I think a variety of opinions on any theological topic is beneficial.
Hmmm…just thinking some more about the validity of the argument….
For the argument to be a valid one, need I argue that the conclusion necessarily must follow from these premises? (Is that where the invalidity comes in?) That is, instead of asking you about the overall structure of the argument, is this more about defending my conclusion as coming from the premises and demonstrating that your statement, “for there could be a person who God desires to be in a right relationship with Himself, and who God could determine him/her to accept a relationship with Himself, but who is in actuality not saved.” is off base?
Just trying tot think this through.
Travis,
a passing thought… you have reconstructed the symbolic argument in a way that it must be invalid/unsound/whatever. But that’s not the only way to reconstruct it symbolically. Could it be that you’ve structured it in such a way that you can defeat it symbolically?
You still have at the heart of the issue, however you symbolize it, that Calvinists claim God to be all powerful AND all loving, yet this God chooses not to save all persons This is a contradiction, unless you can love someone when you’re sending them to Hell. Of course, again, my problem with Calvinism is that they say God loves Godself more than God loves God’s creations, and thus has no problem sending them to hell if it makes God look better (somehow).
Hank,
This is where we differ. IMO, the Bible is very clear that God’s central and defining attribute is love (defined as self-giving/self-sacrifice). All other attributes, including all of those you listed, must be interpreted and understood through that lens. If I understand you correctly, you see that God is all of those things equally; that God has no one defining attribute.
If this is true (of us), then our discussion really needs to revolve around our definitions of God. Or, more precisely, why we view God as we do (which may bleed over into Honzo’s post…)
What do you think?
JR,
When I reconstructed Tom’s argument I did it as faithfully and as fairly as possible with regards to Tom’s original meaning and intent. If I have not captured what is being said in my symbollic reconstruction, I hope that anyone will point out my straw-man.
This raises the question, “why construct it symbolically in the first place?” I do so in order that there be no ambiguity in my objections to Tom’s argument. This is not to underhandedly slip my objections in by a fallacious means, but exactly to do the oppisite. Again I say, I hope everyone will be very critical of my reconstruction.
Concerning the appartent contradiction of God’s omnipoteance, His infinite love for all mankind, and God sending some to Hell and not others, I believe this will be addressed better in terms of Tom’s argument and the need for supplemental premises to make his argument a valid one. More on this later.
Tom,
I was so happy to read your previous posts, for understanding validity is crucial to a good argument.
Ok, first I just want to give what validity is in its essence. All that validity is concerned with is the relationship between the premises and the conclusion, not with the truth of the premises in the least bit. So, what you are saying is this. If one holds to the truth of (3a) and (4)–which Calvinists do–then one must necessarily hold to the (5). That is all that is being said about validity. However, the argument as of right now fails to meet this relationship of necessity. Let us call the conjunction of (3a) and (4) set S. If I believe in set S, does that mean that I must believe (5) to be true? No, because there is another premise needed to form a necessary relationship between set S and the conclusion (5).
Let’s take a look at the original form of the argument and I will give a possible premise that would solve the problem of invalidity. I will call this new premise (4a). Since your conclusion is in the form of a conditional, I will use “condtional proof” as the proof of the argument.
3a. If p, then q
4. If p, then r
4a. If q and r, then s
___________________
5. Therefore, if p, then s
Proof:
6. p Assume for conditional proof
7. q 3a,6 modus ponens
8. r 4, 6 modus ponens
9. q and r 7,8 conjuction
10. s 4a,9 modus ponens
11. If p, then s 6-10 conditional proof
There we have our proof with the addition of (4a), and thus we have our valid argument. What would (4a) look like in Tom’s argument? It would be:
4a. For all X, if God desires X to be in a right relationship with Himself and God is able to determine X freely to accept a right relationship with God, then God saves X (always and necessarily).
Now, would the Calvinist accept the truth of (4a)? If he does, then you’ve got him.
What do you guys think? Does Reformed theology hold that (4a) is true?
Tom,
I was so happy to read your previous posts, for understanding validity is crucial to a good argument.
Ok, first I just want to give what validity is in its essence. All that validity is concerned with is the relationship between the premises and the conclusion, not with the truth of the premises in the least bit. So, what you are saying is this. If one holds to the truth of (3a) and (4)–which Calvinists do–then one must necessarily hold to the (5). That is all that is being said about validity. However, the argument as of right now fails to meet this relationship of necessity. Let us call the conjunction of (3a) and (4) set S. If I believe in set S, does that mean that I must believe (5) to be true? No, because there is another premise needed to form a necessary relationship between set S and the conclusion (5).
Let’s take a look at the original form of the argument and I will give a possible premise that would solve the problem of invalidity. I will call this new premise (4a). Since your conclusion is in the form of a conditional, I will use “condtional proof” as the proof of the argument.
3a. If p, then q
4. If p, then r
4a. If q and r, then s
___________________
5. Therefore, if p, then s
Proof:
6. p (Assume for conditional proof)
7. q (3a,6 modus ponens)
8. r (4, 6 modus ponens)
9. q and r (7,8 conjuction)
10. s (4a,9 modus ponens)
11. If p, then s (6-10 conditional proof)
There we have our proof with the addition of (4a), and thus we have our valid argument. What would (4a) look like in Tom’s argument? It would be:
4a. For all X, if God desires X to be in a right relationship with Himself and God is able to determine X freely to accept a right relationship with God, then God saves X (always and necessarily).
Now, would the Calvinist accept the truth of (4a)? If he does, then you’ve got him.
What do you guys think? Does Reformed theology hold that (4a) is true?
Sorry about posting that twice guys. I was trying to edit the first. The second is easier to read, so disregard the first.
JR,
I do agree that one of the primary issues in the Calvinism-Arminianism debate, especially those who hold to the Edwardsian view of God, is why do we view God the way we do. I do think that the discussion is very silent on that front.
Mainly, I was wanting to try to correct your definition of God’s glory from my personal perspective. That in my personal understanding of the Bible, God’s glorifying himself is the very giving of himself (John 12:23). For God to give glory to himself is to manifest goodness and reveal his name and its meaning, just as God promised to do for Moses (Exodus 33:19) and did (Exodus 34:5-7). God’s very act of making himself look "good" (as John Piper would put it) or glorious or glorifying himself is to be as self-sacrificing as he can be, to give of himself. It is the essence of the cross in John’s view (John 12:23 ESV) and in Paul’s view (2 Corinthians 4:4-6 ESV). Many people (as I mentioned in the previous comment) simply do not take this into account.
Travis,
No, in my understanding of Reform theology, Reform(ers?) do not hold that. I think Tom’s point (with which I agree) is that they sort of have to hold to that if their other views of God are to be true. They don’t hold to 4a, even though they should, which indicates that they are logically inconsistent.
Why would an all-powerful God who wants to save everyone NOT save (most of) them?
Jr,
Thank you for your last post. I think you have found the rub of what is being said here.
First, you said that the Reformed theologian would in fact deny the truth of (4a), but that he should accept the truth of (4a), for to do otherwise would be logically inconsistent (i.e. the Reformed theologian would be contradicting himself by denying (4a)). Where exactly does this contradiction occur? Let’s take a look at what the Calvinist holds to (which should be a set a propositions that are contradiction):
12. God is omnipotent
13. God is wholly good
14. God desires for all persons to be in a right relationship with Him (because he loves all persons)
15. All persons are not saved
Let’s take this perliminary set and call it set S1. Now, is set S1 a logical contradiction? As of right now, if it is, then it is merely an implicit contradition. To make if formally contradictory, another premise is needed. Not only this, but a this premise must be one that is necessarily true, so that Calvinist would have no room to deny the additional premise.
What would this/these necessarily true premise/premises be?
First, I’m assuming that "to be saved" (15.) and "in a right relationship with [God]" (14.) Yea or nay?
If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to save all persons. (this can be assumed by the definition of ‘omnipotent’)
If God is wholly good, then s/he does not desire that his/her creations suffer (probably not temporarily but certainly not eternally). [This may not logically follow from/be implied by 'wholly good', depending on one's understanding of 'good'. I would say that, in my understanding of 'good', God could not be considered good if s/he "delighted in the death of the wicked".]
Now, in my understanding of Calvinism, humans have no free will (at least with reference to salvation). Thus, God and God alone determines whether humans will go to heaven or hell. [This may be the additional premise?]
If that’s true, then we have this.
a) God is omnipotent (capable of saving all persons)
b) God is wholly loving (desires that all persons be saved/no persons are damned)
c) God alone determines whether a person will be saved or damned
d) All persons are not saved. (what most [?] Calvinists would agree to)
Isn’t this a contradiction?
These are a logical contradiction, are they not?
JR,
You said, "I would say that, in my understanding of ‘good’, God could not be considered good if s/he ‘delighted in the death of the wicked.’" I must say that while this is true, you must also take into account Deuteronomy 28:63 and God delighting in destroying Israel, as well as Paul saying that God desires to display his wrath on the vessels prepared for destruction (Romans 9:22). This puts a big whole in (b) of your argument for God, being wholly loving also desires to and delights in displaying his wrath.
You also said, "Now, in my understanding of Calvinism, humans have no free will (at least with reference to salvation)." This is not how the Calvinsim I have been taught and believe understands the connection of the will and God’s sovereignty in salvation. I think Brad might get to this in his series on TULIP so I will wait to see what he says on this. Calvinists do not reject the idea of a human will having freedom in salvation. We just do not believe that it is free in the libertarian sense which would thus limit God’s freedom.
Hank,
For every verse you can quote me in favor of God’s delight in destruction, I can quote you one that says essentially the opposite. I have made this point before on the site - quoting verses at one another back and forth isn’t going to solve anything. If a certain set of verses could decide these issues definitively, then surely after 2,000 years we wouldn’t still be debating this.
But the fact of the matter is, godly, intelligent men and women on all sides of this debate STILL argue. It doesn’t come down to verses; it comes down to the foundational assumptions with which we interpret these verses. I am a pacifist with distinctly Open Theistic leanings (though I don’t embrace their whole system by any means). I understand God’s defining attribute to be self-sacrificial love. This colors my interpretation of all of those verses we quote back and forth.
So what about you (everyone)? What colors your interpretation of this issue? Why do you believe the way you do?
Can we all agree that there is no pure, objective reading of any text, or is that a whole separate discussion?
JR and Tom,
In this post, I just want to lay all my cards down. This topic has been a great discussion, and it has brought up some great points. Tom’s original argument looked, at least prima facia, valid and sound. However, under more careful consideration and analyzation, there are more problems to be found than solutions in this argument. I think one reason why this is the case is because it is far more difficult to nail down the exact intentions, desires, and Sovereign Wills of the Holy God.
This being said, our discussion took us along to a set I called set S1, which JR took to be contradictory. I have to say that I find S1 to be neither explicity contraditory (e.g a and not a) nor formally contradictory (e.g. 1. if p, then q, 2. p, 3. Therefore, not q), nor implicitally contradictory. I entertained the idea that set S1 was implicitly contradictory, but in order for it to be so, there would have to be found some propostion P were P is both necessarily true and when conjoined to S1 would form a formal contradiction. I believe one will not be able to find such a proposition P, and even if one could, the burden is on the Arminian to find this proposition, not on the Calvinist to prove that it is necessarily true that S1 is not necessarily false (i.e. possibly true).
However, what could the Calvinist say? A possible objection to JR’s previous post would be to (a). The attribute of God’s omnipotence is a highly nuanced and mysterioius attribute that has perplexed philosophers and theologians for centuries, for trying to define the limits and meaning of omnipotence is difficult to say the least. For example, to say that God can do anything would be to simplify the matter, for God cannot create a married bachelor. I believe that (a) is also a form of this simplification of omnipotence. Perhaps it is possible that God cannot save all people. Perhaps there is unknown intention of His divine will that prohibits God’s sovereign will from actualizing all people to be saved. I think one must at least say that this is at least possible, but if one does, then the idea that S1 is contradictory falls to the ground. (Yet, this talk of “necessity” and “probablility” is bringing us into the realm of modal systems of logic, which is beyond my knowledge of its exact and technical rules and laws. So I really can’t say too much more.)
On a personal note, I am not exactly sure where I fall on the Arminian/Calvinist debate. I would have to describe myself as a non-Arminian right now. I don’t think there has be any sufficient exegitical arguments for the libertarian stance in Scripture, but I don’t think there is a case for double predestination either. A lot more work needs to be done in the area of hermeneutics proper, exigetical theories, philosophy of language and science, church history and the development of its dogmas, and the discovery of primary sources and the use of epigraphical texts for better Biblical lexicons. I think by accepting that we all have a preunderstanding that we bring to the text of the Bible, we can over come this preunderstanding (which comes from our experiences and community) and better exegize the Bible by objective analysis and humility. This is what Grant Osborne calls the “hermeneutical spiral,” where scholars both inductively and deductively discover truths by a means of “faith seeking understanding.”
Soli Deo Gloria gentlemen,
Travis
Travis,
On what is clearly a tangent
Why should we strive to be objective? Why must we ‘overcome’ our preunderstanding? (I doubt that’s even possible.) Even logic and philosophy as systems of thought are culturally bound and defined. Can’t we acknowledge that none of us is objective and proceed from there?
JR,
This tangent will probably warrant its on comment page :). I recognize the fact that overcoming one’s own preunderstanding is very very difficult, and I know some would say that this is impossible. I however disagree. Unlike many of conservative theologians, I acknowledge the fact that all have some preunderstanding through which they view the words of Scripture. Unlike the liberal theologians, I do believe that we can overcome our preunderstandings, and arrive at the objective truth.
How? Well take me for example. I would say my preunderstanding consists not so much along demonational ties (I grew up in three different churches, one being “non-demonational”), but I am heavly influenced by Western philosophical thought, Reformation theology, some of the Catholic scholastics, and a general attitude of faith seeking understanding. I find that great places to start with extra-Biblical literature would be Aquinas, Augustine, Anslem, Calvin, Luther (some), Bonhoeffer, Barth (some), Schaeffer, and Lewis. Of course all of these giants and their works have tempered my understanding of Scripture. But they do not get to have final say (or authority) over theological truths and the system these truths together build. That is only done by the Word of God.
How is this done? Well this is the “hermeneutical spiral” I mentioned earlier. This term is from Osbourne’s book “The Hermeneutical Spiral.” What he described in 500 pages, I am going to try to do in a couple :). In essence, this spiral is the path that the theologian takes in order to arrive at the ultimate and objective truth that God has given us. The theologian dedutively applies hermeneutical principles and theological descions to the text, while the text inductively informs the theologian of formulative truths.
So what influences theological dogma and truths? Community, experience, tradition, and philosophical outlooks.
What determines theological dogmas and truths? The Word of God alone.
well said travis!.
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Thank you for those kind words Brad!.
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Hey guys!
So I have read through most of the posts here, and this is a great discussion. There is so much to say I don’t even know where to start. On a different discussion, JR and I got off onto a tangent, and I feel what I said there would be relevant here. Here is what I said:
“This tangent will probably warrant its on comment page :). I recognize the fact that overcoming one’s own preunderstanding is very very difficult, and I know some would say that this is impossible. I however disagree. Unlike many of conservative theologians, I acknowledge the fact that all have some preunderstanding through which they view the words of Scripture. Unlike the liberal theologians, I do believe that we can overcome our preunderstandings, and arrive at the objective truth.
How? Well take me for example. I would say my preunderstanding consists not so much along demonational ties (I grew up in three different churches, one being “non-demonational”), but I am heavly influenced by Western philosophical thought, Reformation theology, some of the Catholic scholastics, and a general attitude of faith seeking understanding. I find that great places to start with extra-Biblical literature would be Aquinas, Augustine, Anslem, Calvin, Luther (some), Bonhoeffer, Barth (some), Schaeffer, and Lewis. Of course all of these giants and their works have tempered my understanding of Scripture. But they do not get to have final say (or authority) over theological truths and the system these truths together build. That is only done by the Word of God.
How is this done? Well this is the “hermeneutical spiral” I mentioned earlier. This term is from Osbourne’s book “The Hermeneutical Spiral.” What he described in 500 pages, I am going to try to do in a couple :). In essence, this spiral is the path that the theologian takes in order to arrive at the ultimate and objective truth that God has given us. The theologian dedutively applies hermeneutical principles and theological descions to the text, while the text inductively informs the theologian of formulative truths.
So what influences theological dogma and truths? Community, experience, tradition, and philosophical outlooks.
What determines theological dogmas and truths? The Word of God alone.”
As an augment to this, I have to say to the postmodern defenders (seems ironic to speak of defending postmodernism or that which claims that nothing is defensible) that I agree with the ontological claims that that they have made (e.g. God does exists, there is an absolute truth, ect.), but their epistemological claims are ambigiuous and equivocal. This is a problem since this debate centers on what is the correct epistemology. So to the postmoderns I ask, how do we come to know this absolute truth or how God exists?
Travis, I want to work with your claim on what determines theological dogmas and truth a little bit. That being, “The Word of God alone.”
What do you mean by that? Do you mean the Bible? Whose Bible (for there are many different compilations, there have been many more throughout history, and our modern text-critical editions are compilations that never actually existed in history)? What constitutes the Word of God? How do we determine what the Word of God is? If it’s just scripture, we have to determine what scripture means, what constitutes it, and where we draw boundary lines. Do we simply appeal to past church councils? I’m willing to bet that if any of us had theological discussions with many of the men (they were all men afterall) who made those decisions, we’d often come away shocked at the things they believed.
Do you mean Jesus as the incarnate Word (logos)? How much of logos theology does one bring into this, how far back (Plato?), and how far forward (Origen/Justin Martyr?/later?) does one go. Justin Martyr’s study of logos theology ultimately led him toward beliefs bordering on Universal Salvation…I doubt many here would be comfortable with that conclusion of the Word of God.
Going with the Word of God as scripture…we can only say that it determines our theological dogmas and truths in the fact that we view it as authoritative. Beyond that, any text is by nature a fluid and changing object. The texts in and of themselves have no inherent meaning, other than the meaning we arrive at through interaction with the text.* Our influences change the way we read texts. The hermeneautical principles we apply play a role. The kind of day we’ve had, whether or not we’ve had coffee that morning, etc…a great many things play a role in the way we read and understand texts. How the text appears visually (red letter? leather bound? chapters and verses?) impacts the way we read and interact with scripture. I’ve listed all these things without even touching on translation…which as you know well, can be a very tricky and often tendentious process.
The problem arises when we pretend that none of the above matters, that we can just go with the “plain sense of the text” (whatever that means). What we’re really doing is placing our own conditioned reading of the text above others, without acknowledging some of the most base (yet important) assumptions we make. Some would say we must find authorial intent (which, depending on your view on inspiration, could actually refer to God as the author). Yet, authorial intent is nigh impossible to achieve, especially when reading across thousands of years of change in language and cultural conventions. There is a seduction to think that the single way we think the text should be read is the right way. Such hermeneutical principles allowed the biblical justification of the debasement of women for centuries (to this day in some places), America’s treatment of the Indians and Blacks, Germany’s treatment of the Jews, and South Africa’s treatment of Black Africans…when I think all of us would agree that they bible justifies no such thing. It is the hope of many people who approach texts with postmodern presuppositions, that we can be critical and creative enough to avoid such disasters in the future.
So, I’ll say that I agree with you…our sacred texts are infinitely valuable in the formation of our faith. But when one says we view the texts as an authority, do we really just mean our personal reading of the texts, and that other readings don’t really reflect the authority of scripture? These are questions we should all ask ourselves, post/non/modern.
* That being the case, there are limits to the amount of possible readings a text can have that are influenced by genre, date, etc. The Gospel of Mark, for instance, simply cannot be a recipe for hot dogs. Yet, well reasoned, honest, intelligent, and spiritually discerning people can come to very different conclusions on Mark’s presentation of atonement or the divinity of Jesus Christ.
Cheapham,
First, the string of questions you posed in your first four paragraphs are relevant, but lack any persuasive force in the postmodern’s arsenal. You forget that I not a modern, and I do (like many conservative, evangilical Christians) recognize the fact that everone has a preunderstanding that they bring to the text when they interpret the text. This preunderstanding conists in hermeneutical principles, historical theology, biblical theology, and systematic theology, all of which the exegete applies to the text deductively. However, I also believe that the exegete can inductively determine the meaning of the text, and this process is the “spiral” I mentioned above.
Yet, here is the rub. You believe the meaning of the text lies within the reader (like a good postmodern), yet I believe that the meaning lies within the author.* What needs to be discussed here is where we think the meaning lies and why? Also, what implications follow from our understanding of where the meaning of the text lies? I believe that if the meaning of the text lies within and the reader, then that would be the death of exegesis and hermeneutics altogether (thus, the death of propositional and dogmatic theology). A discussion like this would warrant its own post.
Best,
Travis
Just to clarify, I didn’t say that meaning lies entirely with the reader. The text has some agency which is part of the conditioning that brought it about (genre, time, sociopolitical setting, etc.). That doesn’t necessarily preclude a reader from removing a text from those conditions…but I see meaning coming about through the readers “interaction” with the text. It’s much more dialectical, rather than the reader lording meaning over the text. We can come to approximtions of “intent” I suppose, but I’d venture a wager that making such claims is more a political move rather than something objective. Given the nature of the readers role in meaning-making, I feel that it is imperative that readings be done in a much more communal manner than has been typical.
I don’t see how acknowledging the reader’s role in the construction of meaning brings about the death of exegesis and hermeneutics. Such things are tools that are a part of an individual’s/community’s repetoire when going about meaning making. I don’t find the theoretical frameworks of poststructuralists like Derrida or Foucault without problems, but I do find valuable and helpful aspects of their work when I go about interpretation. It’s the same thing with exegetical models built on greek translation, grammatical mapping, etc.
I’m not overly familiar with what “propositional theology” means, but I’ve personally found a lot of harm done with dogmatic theology…it’s “death” might not be such a bad thing.
A new post on the topic of where meaning lies, and how we get to it, would probably be a good idea. This conversation has hit all sorts of topics, perhaps we should focus?