A few days ago, I posted a picture which I thought demonstrated the relationship between Modernism, Foundationalism, Fundamentalism, and Christianity. I’d like to clarify what I am talking about there, here.
By Modernism, I mean the paradigm(s) of thought which owe their intellectual roots in the Enlightenment. Essential traits of Modernism are as follows:
- The elevation of reason as the ultimate standard.
- The elevation of science as the ultimate measure truth.
- The elevation of the observable as the only source of evidence.
A lot more could be said here, but those are the features I want to highlight.
Foundationalism is a modernistic epistemological framework which attempts to build a solid foundation of undeniable and fully provable (often by the criteria listed above) truth propositions upon which all other forms of knowledge are built.
Many, if not most, evangelical groups subscribe to a Foundationalist framework for building knowledge. They all assert the absolute truth of the Bible, but, because of their unnoticed acceptance of the modernist and foundationalist framework, they feel as though they must prove beyond a shadow of a doubt the foundation that is the Bible. Once this is proved, then and only then can they proceed to demonstrate how the next piece of theology can be added upon the firm foundation that is the Bible. Once added, then they can logically and rationally add the next brick.
And so on.
And so on.
After a while, you can build a nice systematic theology which is rigid and impenetrable.
…
Unless one of the bricks falls out.
Now you have a hole in your wall. The bricks above now come a tumbling. Suddenly, most of your wall has fallen down and you are standing there looking a fool holding a bunch of spiritual propositions (or laws).
You are very invested in making sure not a single brick ever moves.
After all, you have constructed theology. Nay, you have constructed The Theology. The truth. It has set you free (to play within its walls, of course).
…
Unless one of your scientific premises about the Bible, its accuracy (as you conceive it) and historicity (as you want it to be) is proven wrong by science, history, or any other endeavor. Once you have proven the Bible, it and everything you build upon it suffers the same fear as one of the above bricks.
You see, the Bible is not prime in your endeavor, the scientific demonstration of the Bible’s authenticity is prime.
Because Foundationalists have capitulated to Modernism’s demands of knowledge and truth, we find ourselves arguing that the world is really a few thousand years old.
We need to move beyond Foundationalism, beyond Modernism.
We need to grasp the edges of the scientific/historical/literary/modernist/foundationalist tablecloth and yank it out from under the Bible.
When we do, we will find that the Spirit of the Living God does just fine on his own. Instead of needing justified, he justifies. Instead of being an objective (i.e. scientific) description of reality/history/science, we find that the Spirit speaking through the Bible is the most objective thing in the universe because it describes the world as God wills it to be.
The scary thing is that we have to leave modernism behind. Any such task is fought with fear because this necessarily means that we have to be postmodern.
This is not as scary as it seems on the surface or in Christian chain-emails. In fact, though the road is dangerous, steep, and rocky, it allows us so much more.
… and Postmodernism did not give us relativism. Modernism did.
But I’ll get to that in the next post.
Upcoming: How a post-modern framework might help us in our construction of Theology. How Foundationalists often mistake the bricks for the foundation.
Couple of thoughts:
Modernity is not totally evil. (I think you would agree with me on this). In some circles and conversations, people try to make what modernity brought about and shaped as stupid and evil. I think there are many qualities that GREATLY beneficial to Christianity. The science/logic/reason is not the end all to everything but it is needed. Modernity didn't bring 100% proofs of the bible, but it did bring something that complements and adds to our faith. (sarcastic note–without Christian Modernity–you would not be in a college to critic Modernity!)
Aren't you brick-building too? Isn't this article a brick for Henry!!! (a good brick but none the less a brick)… Read More
“The Spirit of the Living God does good on it's own.” I think one issue that bothers me with this statement is that God always uses people for his work! I think I know what you are saying, “We try to hard to have all the right answers,” but don't discredit our role in ministering to others!
Henry, I have wrestled with the question for a long long time. I would enjoy your response to this question.
It seems like, especially in your article, that you want to move away from modernity and anything related. I bump into people and I have conversations all the time about this issue. If Post-modernity is the answer then we should succumb to it. (many people state that we are now beyond post-modernity…a post-post-modern time).
Anyways, look at this and tell me if it helps/gives/builds your faith at all…… Read More
Julius Caesar's Gallic Wars is a book that nobody questions the reliability/trustworthiness of the book. We have only 10 Manuscripts of the book. Homer's Iliad (which is the most of any book outside of the bible) we have 643 copies. Nobody questions the authenticity of Homer's writing. But we have over 25,000 NT early Manuscripts. When compared to modern day bibles…they match up.
In my mind, this builds my faith and gives me more confidence in knowing what I believe is true. Not that this “evidence” proves Christianity to be true but, I think, it strengths the logical case.
I don't see why I need to through this out the window? How is this not beneficial? This one “Brick” isn't the foundational piece nor should it be but can't it be useful? Useful for ministering to other Christians? Useful for ministering to non-xians?
Casey, why does Christianity require a “logical case”? The notion of a “logical case” as you seem to put it adheres to specifically “Modernist” notions of “logic” and “reason.” Why must we conform our Christianity to these standards in order for it to be legitimate?
As for the issues about Manuscripts…People do very much question the “reliability” of Julius Caesar's Gallic Wars. A text like that is trying to prove something and persuade people. We may be reasonably certain about the comparability of the text we have now and how the text may have existed in the past…but what the text actually says can prove to be very UNreliable. As for Homer's Iliad, it's generally regarded that the Iliad never had one single writer. It is a synthesis of a long oral tradition performed by many performing poets over generations. We actually don't know when to date that text specifically, especially given its long oral tradition leading up to its current state. Further, its authenticity in terms of representing historical events is very problematic, and heavily distrusted. Of course, all of this is applying the logic and reason of “Modernism” onto ancient texts.
With regard to NT Manuscripts…it's not as easy as you explain. But, I'll hold off on that a bit for now. What is this “truth” you appeal to? Why must what you “believe” be “true” in this regard (true to whom, by what standard?)? Not that I'm even saying that your beliefs aren't 'true,' but I wonder why there is an anxiety over the truth of belief. Why is it even framed as “belief”? Belief that the Bible is “accurate”? Do the texts we have today have to match the original manuscripts for them to be “true”? Is our faith as Christians threatened by the accuracy of this collection of texts? Isn't God much bigger than a book? Can't God do great things without our book?
I'm trying to get at some of the bigger philosophical issues at stake here. Sorry if I'm coming off as confusing or even pedantic. This is a continual struggle for a great many Christians (myself included), so in many ways I ask myself these questions.
Forgive me, I don't think I typed my last post that well…
Cheapham, I always enjoy reading your stuff on TheoMasses. Anyways, I don't think I typed my post well. I am not adhering to and defending a Modern mindset. If that is what you gathered, I am sorry. After rereading my post, I think that could be the easy conclusion.
What I am saying is that there are some very significant issues and ideas that I believe Modernity brought to the table that need to stay there. Post-M's, “like Henry's post” want to throw everything out. The majority of Modernity principles and themes (for like of a better term) have flaws, but my simple attempt was to ask if “EVERYTHING” should be thrown away? “Don't throw the baby out with the bath water”
Is/Are there some things that Modernity brought/established that helps our faith? This is what I want answered… ( I think the answer is yes)
These things that aid in our faith are not binding–like you make them be(your perception of Modernity). Just like I might disagree with some of the Post-M stuff, there are still some things that PoMo's believe that aid in our faith too.
Cheapham, I never intended to claim anything about Logic/Modernity being the absolute only paradigm that Christians adhere to. You are read in between the lines. (like I said, I might not have typed the first post that well). All I was trying to do is make a case for 'something” that is “beneficial” to the faith from Modernity.
As for the issues of Manuscripts…you missed understood my goal and failed attempt (I am not an evidentialist apologist). I am not trying to prove anything here and I don't care about dating/reliability to the extent that you are pushing. My desire was to give a simple example of how this does help our faith. I know all about the Gallic Wars and Iliad but comparatively scripture is the one that people blindly disagree with (because they are post-modern!!!). My attempt was only to establish a basis of how this can be a blessing to our faith. I obviously believe Post and Modern thinking, alike, have brought many special insights and truths (if I can be so bold) to the table that helps my faith.
Silly example… would you rather be given 10 dollars or 25,000 dollars? Isn't the answer obvious (25k). 25,000 manuscripts is better than 10 and EVERYONE should find more in the 25000 MSS. Just like you experience God in a song…we can experience God through these elements too, can't we?
I am not claiming that 25,000MSS are verifiable 100% proven undeniably evidence that we can have complete confidence in knowing scripture…
Henry is claiming Modernity is worthless…we need to abandon it… it gives us 0% confidence in faith….
I am claiming that the 25,000MSS is somewhere in between 100%-and 0% (and to be honest…the percent is really low in my mind, but it is greater than 0 nonetheless).
If you disagree, then you must explain why you are even on THIS WEBSITE! (or college classes–I am assuming you have taken bible/history classes with Henry). Your attempt to argue is a direct influence of modernity and it denies Post-mo thinking!——-but SERIOUSLY, I don't want to insult you or spend time argue this side subject…forgive me …lets move on…
Sometimes, it is easy to assume someone is against you. I am not against anything Henry said. I am just probing and asking questions that help me understand better. There is no need to assume that MY Modern mind is somehow closed off to this blind “earth shattering” truth that you are presenting. I am indeed not Modern in the first place. Many Post-Modern students believe everyone else is closed minded and, Henry's Brick idea, is foundationally established/central and can't be unearthed for fear of our own world clasping. I think this is a poor understanding of Modernity and I believe Modernity has some value to our faith.
The only question that I thought needed to be answered from your post (cheapham–and I am glad to answer others, but I felt that your other questions were missing what I was saying in the first place):
Do the texts we have today have to match the original manuscripts for them to be “true”? The answer is YES ( to some degree). Would you believe in Christianity if every MSS 100% denied Jesus actually lived and the MSS claimed Satan was the true prince of God's Kingdom and if the MSS claimed the only way you can be with God in heaven was if you murdered someone in cold blood?
There is value in knowing that the MSS indeed match what our KJV (the only authorized version) states. (Total joke on the KJV)
Casey,
I do agree with you that Modernism has had its merits. But foremost, I recognize that it is artificial, especially to Christianity. And just like Christians needed to realize how we needed to reform our theological method during the Reformation and the so-called Counter-Reformation and in the Restoration movements, such an your/our Stone-Campbell movement, we need to realize that we can't marry Modernism and give into its demands.
Doesn't mean it is not useful, but not what we rest on.
I am great with thing supplementing faith. But we also have to be weary of it running amok. I contend that “Hard Foundationalists” (per the helpful parts of Travis' criticisms) have done just that.
I guess with the brick metaphor (which I culled from Bell's Velvet Elvis), we end up mistaking the whole wall for the Bible itself (which, as a Canonist, I hold to be God's instrument though which the Spirit primarily speaks in present times).
For instance, Grudem's theological constructions end up being taken as absolutely what the Bible teaches (see page 22 of his systematic theology). If you question any of the conclusions, then you are questioning the source itself. This got a good friend of mine in trouble this last year. He had the gall to question a doctrine and used scripture to critique it and was branded a heretic for doing so.
Also, and more importantly, a foundational framework actually belittles the whole of Christian theology and practice. I'll talk more about this later, but Modernism says that the only truth out there is scientific truth. Therefore, all cultural truths are equally valid (as mere opinions). This sounds a lot like something we like to say. The only requirement (and hence real) propositions of Christianity are the “essentials.” They have been absolutely and logically deduced from scripture. Everything else is mere opinion for the sake of unity. This bastardizes much of Christina thought and practice – makes it all relative. No longer can we talk about what is best in a situation, because it all just opinion.
Ok, my comp is dying – hope to talk later on this.
Casey,
Upon what do you base your beliefs concerning the Bible? Why do you think about the Bible as you do?
Just to be clear, and I often am not clear, I don't want to through everything about it away. But I do want to critique it, and the foundational epistemological framework which some of modernity uses.
And now Allan is giving his talk, so I have to cut this short – Casey, I look forward to our interactions here!
Isn't my answer the same as yours! Our experience, other's testimony, blindness!, and Josh Mcdowell!
Guys, remember I am not arguing for Modernity. I am simply claiming it “ain't” all bad. Do you think it is completely bad? Wouldn't ever system of Christianity be rebuked by the latter (Henry, your reformation-counter reformation). But I think we can't scratch all of them from the table. Each one helped and aided us in where our faith is today. I think there is some value in each of them. Am I wrong?
Hey Henry, I thought it would be fun to continue our debate here at Masstheology. Let me reiterate the debate for context. I claimed the following:
“I worry about your formulation of foundationalism and the conclusions you draw from it. You define foundationalism as such:
“Foundationalism is a modernistic epistemological framework which attempts to build a solid foundation of undeniable and fully provable (often by the criteria listed above) truth propositions upon which all other forms of knowledge are built.”
Defining foundationalism this way is too simple and naive. Foundationalism is a complex and multifaceted epistemological theory that can take many forms and be explicated in different ways. Here are some points of contention:
1. Foundationalism is not a modernistic theory per se. Although many modern philosophers held to some form of foundationalism, the philosophical import given to foundationalism has its origins in Aristotle (cf. Posterior Analytics, Bk. l, chap. 2 & 3), and perhaps even Plato (cf. the Third Man argument from the Parmenides, and the discussion of the nature of virtue in the Meno). Moreover, epistemic foundationalism can also be found the works of such medieval greats as Augustine and Aquinas. Finally, there are many contemporary proponents of foundationalism who in no way can be characterized as followers of the early moderns with respect to their philosophical endeavors (e.g. Alvin Plantinga, Alvin Goldman, Michael Bergmann).
Your Venn diagram entails the claim “All foundationlists are modernists.” But this is false given the counterexamples from above. To provide a polemic against foundationalism is really not to argue against a specifically modern theory of which we must disabuse ourselves, but it is really to argue against a theory held by some of the giants of Western philosophy.
2. You claim that all fundamentalists are foundationalists, but foundationalists with respect to what? In order to critique foundationalism, you must be clear what sort of foundationalism you are critiquing, for some are foundationalists with respect to justification, some with respect to warrant, and others with respect to knowledge. Generally, the early moderns are characterized as foundationalists with respect to justification, which I assume is what you are critiquing. Yet you also say that foundationalists build a solid foundation upon which all other forms of knowledge are built (emphasis on “knowledge”). You also later claim, “Many, if not most, evangelical groups subscribe to a Foundationalist framework for building knowledge.” So it is unclear if you are concerned with foundationalism with respect to justification or with respect to knowledge/warrant.
3. Another claim that requires clarification: you say that foundationalism “attempts to build a solid foundation of undeniable and fully provable (often by the criteria listed above) truth propositions…”. However, not all forms of foundationalism require that knowledge/justification rest upon truth claims that are undeniable or fully provable. The specific form of foundationalism you are concerned with is classical (or Cartesian) foundationalism, which is a sub-genre of foundationalism simpliciter. Foundationalism in general (F) is defined as: there are justified/warranted beliefs that justified/warranted not in virtue of being inferred or based on other beliefs. A simpler way of defining F is the claim “there are properly basic beliefs” (i.e. beliefs that are non-inferentially justified/warranted). However, you seem to be only concerned with classical foundationalism, not foundationalism in general. Classical foundationalism (CF) is defined as: there are properly basic beliefs and a belief P is properly basic if and only if P is self-evident or indubitable. Ergo, Descartes claims that the only beliefs that are properly basic are beliefs like “I am having the appearance of red” “I am in pain” “I think”, for all such beliefs are true in virtue of being believed.
This is a serious problem though for how you sketch foundationalism. Your claims are really an attack on CF, but disguised as an attack on F. Many, if not all, of the contemporary philosophers who hold to F have come to reject CF. Consider, as an alternative to classical foundationalism, Reidian foundationalism (namesake of Thomas Reid), which allows for such beliefs as perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs, beliefs in God, and even beliefs concerning the inerrancy of Scripture to be properly basic beliefs. Thus, for the fundamentalist Christians who holds to Reidian foundationalism (e.g. many Reformed Christians are Reidian foundationalists), your critique of foundationalism is seen as a gross non sequitur and irrelevant to their views.
4. Given this consideration of Reidian foundationalism, consider your claim: “[Evangelical foundationalists] assert the absolute truth of the Bible, but, because of their unnoticed acceptance of the modernist and foundationalist framework, they feel as though they must prove beyond a shadow of a doubt the foundation that is the Bible.” But this claim is false for the adherents to more nuanced forms of foundationalism. In fact, the need to prove the Bible (whatever that means) is no longer necessary for the some foundationalists, since the inerrancy and truth of Scripture is taken as a properly basic claim that requires no substantiation. One can reasonably and justifiably accept the inerrancy of Scripture in the absence of defeaters, despite the fact one may not be able to provide evidence or a proof of that claim.
5. What follows from this then is that systematic theologies no longer must rest upon deductively proven, indubitable truth claims. Rather systematic theologies are not as rigid as you claim, for they can easily be constructed given such common sense beliefs as metaphysical realism, the perspicuity of Scripture, and the faculty of the Holy Ghost who aids and guides us through our discovery of God via his Word. Of course there is a human element to any interpretation of Scripture and our constructions of systematic theologies, but why is that a problem? There is a human element to all of our acquisitions to knowledge, but that doesn’t mean we must be skeptics. The point is that some forms of foundationalism can account for such non-rigid theologies that are continuously being refined and discussed as we learn more about God and His Word (cf. the Reformed creed of semper reformanda).
6. In sum, you conclude: “We need to move beyond Foundationalism, beyond Modernism,” and “The scary thing is that we have to leave modernism behind. Any such task is fought with fear because this necessarily means that we have to be postmodern.” First, I think my points have demonstrated that you have given us no reason to leave foundationalism simpliciter behind, but at best you have only shown the demerits of classical foundationalism. I am interested to see an argument against F, not CF. Second, you state that necessarily, if one rejects modernism, then one accepts post-modernism. However, I find that this claim is dubious, as if we fall under either a modernist and postmodernist paradigm. I think that this formulation of the debate is unfair, for there many examples of historic and contemporary Christian philosophers/theologians who neither modernists nor postmodernists. Even a cursory knowledge of such men as Herman Bavinck, Thomas Reid, and Pietro Vermigli will show this to be the case.”
Your rejoinder to my objections were as follow:
“Travis, you of all people should know the difference between popular descriptions and academic technical ones. I am speaking to a non-technical audience. Besides, your counterexamples only talk to CF, not F, so I am not sure what you were doing there.
In reality, I used Foundationalism to describe Hard Foundationalism, which you probably already knew, given they way I talked about it. And it does trace back to Descartes.
Some Reformed Epistemological, such as Plantinga (as you mention) and Wolterstorff critique Hard Foundationalism. But they really are moving in post-modern directions in that they acknowledge the inevitability of our being situated in a particular community and admit the loss of certitude involved in such a acknowledgment.
And I do define post-modernism as that which rejects major features of modernism. It is certainly too early to set out rigid criteria. I use a simplistic definition, but one that is helpful. And certainly postmodernism is not to be conflated with French poststructualists or remnants of modernism's cultural relativity.
I am referring to hard foundationalist systematic theologies such as Wayne Grundem's, which conflate the scientific inductions from the source material with the source material.”
To your rejoinder I gave the following counter-objections:
“Henry, let me consider your counter-objections in turn.
First, you are right in that I do know the difference between laymen descriptions and academic technical terms. I also know that such terms as “foundationalist,” “modernist,” “post-modernist,” “epistemological,” etc. are philosophical/academic terms, not popular terms. Of course you can take such terms and simplify them to the point of conflation and mischaracterization, but that is neither fair to your audience nor to the view that you wish to criticize. Rather, a discussion of foundationalism, its merits/demerits, and its historical misuse by Christian thinkers (whether they be theologians or laypersons) is by its very nature academic. A discussion of this kind requires rigorous analysis, clear definitions of terms, and distinction upon distinction between the nuances that might be involved within the position you are criticizing. If your audience fails to realize and understand what exactly you are trying to say, then you need to clarify all the more, define all the better. To do otherwise is especially dangerous for an audience who has never been introduced to these theories and views, for if you simplify to the point of mischaracterization, then they leave with misunderstandings and prejudices that are difficult to remove.
Secondly, my counterexamples were to neither CF nor to F, but only to your characterization of foundationalism as essentially modernistic. I remained agnostic in my post with respect to whether CF or F were true or false, but I only was trying to refute the claim “All foundationalists are modernists,” which is exactly what your Venn diagram claimed.
Thirdly, I think it would be a huge misnomer to characterize Reformed epistemology as post-modern. Of course this all depends on how you define postmodernism, which I will await for later. Nevertheless, postmodernism is generally understood as a wholly anti-epistemological thesis that completely denies the reality of objective knowledge. Yet both Plantinga and Wolterstorff are defenders of the possibility of such knowledge, and I think both would take issue to be characterized as postmodern. In fact, Plantinga objects to postmodernism as a defeater for Christianity in chapter 13 of Warranted Christian Belief, while also maintaining that postmodernism (as he understands it) is inconsistent with Christian belief.
Fourthly, if you simply define postmodernism as the rejection of modernism, then I think said theory becomes uninteresting. Since you are going to give a more rigid criteria for a definition for postmodernism later, too much should not be made of this. But at least say that as of right now, you are offering not a definition postmodernism, but simply one of many necessary conditions of post modernism.
Fifthly, you claim that most Christian groups historically have been hard foundationalists. I find that this is at least prima facie false. Classical foundationalism (or as you call it hard foundationalism) has it origins in Descartes, so that to call a thinker prior to the early modern era a classical foundationalist would be a revolutionary new insight into historical philosophy. Moreover, many of the Reformers were beyond the pale of classical foundationalism. Although many talked about the certitude of the core Christian creeds, they were not speaking of a Cartesian certainty that was ostensibly required for their basic beliefs. Thus, this claim you make is in need of some historical corroboration.”
After this post, the comments became rather uninteresting and irrelevant to the debate. So we can just pick up from here.
With regard to the last claim of my counter-objections to your rejoinder, I believe you said that you are were only speaking of hard foundaitonalism with respect to the last 100 years, which is a rather truncated view of the history of foundationalism and philosophical thought in general. If I am wrong about this though, please correct.
As for my other objections, none of been answered as of yet, especially concerning some of my comments about Reidian foundationalism. What are your thoughts?
Travis,
Bout to moderate a discussion at the BSU, and my bat is at 15%, so this will be short. I'll agree that it might be truncated, but it is what I am concerning myself with. I might get to the other stuff, but I don't want to wander up a tower and forget what I am addressing. I'll certainly try to clairify what I wrote up off the top of my head before I went to bed a few nights ago. What else real quick…. there was something… Oh, something to keep in mind – a lot of this is a pop-culture critique, about how real people, not just 11 thinkers, are doing and thinking about things. Lastly, moving beyond definitional criticisms, what do you think about the larger picture?
This is in regard to Casey and Cheapham’s discussion:
First, Cheapham asks Casey, “What is this ‘truth’ you appeal to?” The notion of true and what makes a proposition true is an extremely thorny and difficult issue, but I would like to suggests this to Casey as a possible answer to Cheapham’s question. Many historical philosophers have held to what is called the correspondence theory of truth (henceforth CTT), and its origins are found in Aristotle and his famous phrase: “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false; while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.” We may define CTT as the following:
CTT: P is a true proposition if and only if P corresponds to the way things actually are—to the facts.
I take the notion of “fact” as primitive, and thus in no need of definition itself. The notion of “correspond” can have some difficulty to it, so there may be some objection there. Two things to note though: First, “truth” in this instance is not a matter of scientific truth. There is no verification needed in order for proposition to be true. Thus, truth is understood in this way as a necessarily external condition that is removed from our cognitive faculties or our scientific endeavors. Second, following from the first claim, CTT is not Modern conception of truth, so we should have no trepidation in that regard. Needless to say, I think CTT is a good starting point to answer Cheapham’s question. What do you all think?
Second, Cheapham queries, “Why must what you ‘believe’ be ‘true’ in this regard (true to whom, by what standard?)?” If Casey were to accept CTT, how would this question be answered? The question “to whom is a proposition true” is a bit ambiguous. In one sense, we could say a proposition P is true to person S if and only P corresponds to reality and S believes that P, i.e. P is true given CTT and S believes P. In other sense, we could take a relative view of truth, which states that P is true for S if and only if S believes P. If we take your question to be understood in the latter since, it becomes a non sequitur given the acceptance of CTT. This also answers your question concerning what the standard of truth is, namely reality itself. Of course you could object to this by holding to some view of metaphysical anti-realism, but that would require a signification amount of corroboration.
Third, why would we want to have beliefs that correspond to actual reality? Prima facie, this strikes me as an odd question, for how could we not want this? Having true beliefs is simply a basic human endeavor. We all desire to have knowledge (however that may be defined), and knowledge entails true belief.
What do you all think?
Henry,
I think we are describing two sides of the same coin. I agree with most of what you have said.
Your last paragraph is my concern. For two reasons:
1. “a foundational framework actually belittles the whole of Christian theology and practice.”
The pragmatics of your PoMo doesn't seem to be different. Aren't you trying to frame, albeit different, your believe. Isn't all believes/philosophies, in part, a construction built on certain principles or values? Don't we have to start SOMEWHERE? I don't see how someone can teach PoMo without starting somewhere (but I know people try!). I don't think it is really about frameworks and foundational starting points–in my mind the most important aspect of apologetics is humility. A humble truth-seeker will lay his beliefs down when confronted with the better. I can see how someone can get frustrated with Wayne Grudem's thinking–but are you really far from him? (side note-systematic theology is still somewhat foreign to me. The schools that I have studied under purposely distanced themselves from systematic teaching. So I feel your frustration here).
2. I really, really liked your connection from Modernity to church practice of essentials/opinions, but I think your thinking is a little off. Maybe perhaps I don't fully understand where you are coming from. But I think Paul addresses many of your statements in his writings. Romans 12-14 addresses weaker brother/stronger brother issues. John writes about the so-called Gnostic teaching that is spreading and says “essentially” to believe this way and not that way.
Now if you are talking about how people have screwed up…fights have broken out…churches divided because of our “opinions” then I think that is more of a statement about our “hearts” then minds. Help me see what you are trying to convey maybe I am not reading you right.
Logic did not come from the Age of Reason or Modernity. People were reasoning their faith way before Luther/Hegel/and Locke.
Henry and Cheapham, you guys are probably sitting together on some couches laughing at me and my ill thinking!
CTT – nice if we had access to the facts. But none of us are privileged observers – save for God. And his speaking to us is always and necessarily contextual. Even the mystic collapse their direct experiences into human forms and language… if they are experiencing God at all. Thus the model is not as helpful as it first seems, imo.
Henry, objecting to CTT by claiming that we have no access to the facts, defining accessibility in terms of divine accessibility, is irrelevant to what CTT asserts. You are making an epistemological critique to an essentially metaphysical doctrine. It is one thing to define what “truth” (i.e. the term we use in everyday speech), but it is quite another claim that we can know what it true.
Cheapham was asking of Casey some elucidation of his use of the term “truth,” not an elucidation of knowledge. To make the distinction between truth and knowledge clear, consider: P can be true without being believed, and P can be true without any epistemic subjects in the world whatsoever. However, worlds where there are knowledge statements require epistemic subjects, because knowledge statements entail belief statements. What is more though, true statements do not entail knowledge statements. (There is a problem with what I just sketched: Since God is a necessary being, he exists in every possible world, and moreover, God is necessarily an epistemic agent who has beliefs–given his omniscience. Strictly speaking then, there is no possible world where knowledge assertions do not exists. Simple solution: the knowledge I am speaking of in this post is strictly human knowledge, for that is all we are really concerned with.)
Thus, I am making no claim on what knowledge is, only truth. Your claims of contextualization, direct experiences, and the problem of human forms and language are all epistemological problems, not metaphysical. Thus, CTT is helpful for even the radical skeptic who claims we have knowledge whatsoever. You can be a skeptic and claim that there are certain necessary and sufficient conditions for truth, just that we can never come to know when a proposition meets those conditions.
You know, your best criticism is on the slipperiness of the term Foundationalism. But beyond that, I think you are missing the forest for the trees and I really don't have the time or temperament to get into minutia with you here.
Perhaps, but this is mainly about the best form of Christian epistemology, not metaphysics. The CTT is intimately linked if not equated with how we know things. For the last 100 years (and this is my main point, even if i did not make it well above) we (liberal Xians, Conservative Christians, and the Evangelical and Fundamentalist subgroups) have used this foundationalist framework. Everything is a chain. This is what this is concerned with, not with philosophy as a whole outside of the Church. I could careless about them (even though I'll maintain that listening to them and appropriating what is useful is a good idea).
A careful look at CTT will demonstrate that CTT is not concerned with epistemology, but only with giving the necessary and sufficient conditions for what makes a proposition true. A striking feature that is absent from CTT and one which is included in any epistemological analysis of knowledge is the reference to a subject. CTT makes no reference to any doxastic subject, for it is not concerned with beliefs but only with propositions. One may object though, are not all propositions beliefs? This is a somewhat controversial claim in philosophy of language and metaphysics, but I think it is pretty intuitive that propositions can exist without being believed. Consider the following: we take the following proposition to be true in the actual world, “All triangles are three-sided.” Call this proposition Q. Now imagine a world bereft of any human subjects. It would still be the case that Q is true, for Q is a necessary truth and so is true in every possible world. But if Q is true in a world, then we must say somehow that Q exists in that world (perhaps as a universal). Yet no one believes Q in this particular world, for there is no one to believe Q in this world. Therefore, we have a case where there is a proposition that is not a belief. Therefore, not all propositions are belief. Therefore, since CTT is only committed to claims about propositions, it is not committed to claims about beliefs, and thus, it is not an epistemological theory and is not concerned with how we come to know or if we know things.
Regardless though, I realize this is digressing from your original post, because foundationalism is an essentially epistemological theory. I only brought up CTT because of the questioning Cheapham was providing to Casey.
A careful look at CTT will demonstrate that CTT is not concerned with epistemology, but only with giving the necessary and sufficient conditions for what makes a proposition true. A striking feature that is absent from CTT and one which is included in any epistemological analysis of knowledge is the reference to a subject. CTT makes no reference to any doxastic subject, for it is not concerned with beliefs but only with propositions. One may object though, are not all propositions beliefs? This is a somewhat controversial claim in philosophy of language and metaphysics, but I think it is pretty intuitive that propositions can exist without being believed. Consider the following: we take the following proposition to be true in the actual world, “All triangles are three-sided.” Call this proposition Q. Now imagine a world bereft of any human subjects. It would still be the case that Q is true, for Q is a necessary truth and so is true in every possible world. But if Q is true in a world, then we must say somehow that Q exists in that world (perhaps as a universal). Yet no one believes Q in this particular world, for there is no one to believe Q in this world. Therefore, we have a case where there is a proposition that is not a belief. Therefore, not all propositions are belief. Therefore, since CTT is only committed to claims about propositions, it is not committed to claims about beliefs, and thus, it is not an epistemological theory and is not concerned with how we come to know or if we know things.
Regardless though, I realize this is digressing from your original post, because foundationalism is an essentially epistemological theory. I only brought up CTT because of the questioning Cheapham was providing to Casey.